Representative Qualifications

Arguing that ballot fees are foreclosed by the original understanding of the House and Senate Qualifications Clauses.

Arguing that where the Constitutional text and intent of the Framers is unclear, the historical practice of state enactment of additional qualifications from the earliest Congresses should be persuasive.

Arguing that the Framers did not intend for the states to be permitted to add additional qualifications.

Discussing Justice Thomas’ originalist analysis of the Qualifications Clause and residual power in the sovereign people in U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton.

Arguing that, in part because other limitations on the powers of States are expressed explicitly and not by negative implication, the representative qualifications clause does not “preclude additional, reasonable qualifications that are not otherwise unconstitutional.”

Noting uncertainty as to which body, if any, may enact term limits.

Arguing that the text and the history of the Constitution do not cure ambiguity with regard to whether the Clause’s enumerated qualifications are exclusive.

Arguing that the original meaning of this clause prohibits the imposition of term limits for members of Congress either by Congress or by states.

Arguing that the Qualifications Clause’s requirements were meant to be exclusive.

Arguing that exclusion of term limits from the Constitution is insufficient to establish that the Framers meant to prohibit them, and that term limits are consistent with the Framers’ fear of an “aristocratic legislature.”

Arguing that “nothing in the history or text of the U.S. Constitution forbids the people of the several states from adding qualifications for federal legislators through their state constitutions.”