President Pro Tempore

Discussing the meaning of “recess” in the Recess Appointment Clause and using intratextual analysis, semantic meaning, and syntactic analysis to argue that “absence” as used in Art. 1 § 3 Cl. 5 is used in the “state,” not “event,” sense of the word.

Querying whether the Framers understood “officer” in the Succession Clause to embrace “legislative officers” like the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the “other officers” in Art. 1 § 3 Cl. 5, and surveying arguments based on intratextual analysis, historical context, and Framers’ intent.

Arguing that the phrase, “and also a President pro tempore,” though seemingly set off by parenthetical commas, is best read in modern English by omitting the commas.

Citing “or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States” to argue that the presidency is an “office” or “trust” under the Constitution.

Arguing that “one of the obvious purposes of the Constitution’s intricate scheme of separated powers ‘is to ensure that government action generally takes place only when distinct actors with distinct roles and functions all agree that the action is permissible,’” and briefly noting that the House and Senate’s ability to “choose their other officers” are exceptions – the executive has no role in that process – and arguing that “[w]hether the courts have any role in that process is a tale for another time.”

Using intratextual analysis and evidence of the Framers’ intent to argue that Presidential succession law is unconstitutional because legislative “other officers” are not “Officers of the United States” under the Succession Clause.

Making textual, historical, and structural arguments for the proposition that “[t]he Amars’ reading of ‘Officer of the United States’ to exclude legislators is persuasive and requires no comment. Their equation of ‘Officer’ with ‘Officers of the United States,’ however, should give us pause.”