Presentment Clause

Arguing that the text and structure of the Constitution, including the Presentment Clause, “establish that a bill is passed if and only if it receives a majority vote.”

Noting that the veto was intended in part to provide the President with another tool for exercising power in foreign affairs.

Exploring origins of “Sundays excepted” and rejecting the “Christian nation” thesis in favor of deliberation and federalism purposes for enshrining Sunday exception.

Arguing that “[m]any other founding-era writings emphasized that by dividing the legislative power among independent bodies, bicameralism and presentment would make it more difficult for any group actuated by self-interest to capture the legislative process. And, quite apart from any concern with factions, some influential Founders understood bicameralism and presentment as a device to promote caution and deliberation in the lawmaking process—to restrain the momentary passions that sometimes infect the political system.”

Arguing that evidence of the original meaning of the clause does not indicate that “passed” is limited to majority votes (i.e., that Congress may impose supermajority voting rules, as long as those rules are themselves repealable by simple majority.

Noting that the Framers included the presidential veto both to guard against legislative encroachment on executive power and to promote circumspect lawmaking, and arguing that Line Item Veto Act both unconstitutionally burdens the veto power and impermissibly delegates power to the President.

Arguing that “[t]he term ‘adjournment’ here should be understood to refer to all recesses, because both intersession and intrasession recess can interfere with the President’s constitutional right to take ten days to return a bill to Congress.”

Arguing that it is not clear from Founding era evidence whether or not the Framers would have approved of the line-item veto.

Contending that “[t]here is good historical evidence that the veto power of the Constitution as understood by its Eighteenth Century drafters and ratifiers includes what we now call a line-item veto.”

Arguing riders and multi-topic legislation are not embraced by the original understanding of “bill.”

Arguing that, although the Framers did not consider the particular question of line-item vetoes, a broad construction of the Presentment Clause’s intended function supports their constitutionality as a check on legislative overreach.