Pardon Power

Arguing that Article II incorporates fiduciary obligations, including the duties of loyalty and good-faith, that constrain the exercise of the pardon power.

Suggesting that the Constitution’s text, structure, and history support the idea that the President may pardon civil offenses.

Proposing that the Founders intended the President to have a robust pardon power and that the President’s pardon power was broadly accepted in the early days of the Republic.

Arguing that, in light of the Constitution’s text, structure, and history, the President is the constitutional prosecutor of all federal offenses.

Arguing that the intent of the Framers and the words and themes of the Constitution do not support the idea that the President can pardon himself.

Examining the historical evolution of the President’s pardoning power, from medieval English practice through modern American use, and arguing that the clemency powers of the President should be limited for executive branch officials.

Tracing the use of the clemency power from its historical origins to the modern day and proposing procedures to divest clemency decisions from the individual discretion of the President.

Analyzing the Framers’ writings and debates, along with colonial and early federal criminal prosecution practices, to determine that the Framers did not intend prosecution to be a core executive function.