Judicial Vesting Clause

Examining the original understanding of state-court jurisdictional obligations to show the Constitution was not intended to infringe on power of states to define the jurisdiction of their courts.

Analyzing Danforth and Moore decisions of Roberts Court to show that, although individual justices disagree about whether a particular case raises a federal constitutional question, most of the justices favor exclusive federal judicial authority over the interpretation of federal law when it is clear a federal question is presented.

Refuting claim that judicial review was invented with Marbury or that judicial review is contrary to the original meaning of the Constitution by demonstrating that that the founders contemplated judicial nullification of legislation enacted by the states and by Congress.

Tracing the dynamic interpretation of “sovereign immunity” by judges and arguing that, given the adverse effects of sovereign immunity on courts’ capacities to provide individual justice, it is past time to move back towards more restrictive understandings of the doctrine’s scope.

Arguing against the assumption that that the judicial power is vested identically and discretely in each and every Article III court created by the Constitution or Congress.

Analyzing the compromises leading to Article III and the Supremacy Clause to show that the principal mechanism for keeping federal law supreme over contrary state law was not an assured “quantity” of federal “arising under” jurisdiction but an assured “quality” of federal judging in cases where Congress confers jurisdiction.

Advancing a two-tiered “Neo-Federalist” interpretation of Article III: first, Congress must give jurisdiction over “all Cases” to federal courts, whose primary function is exposition; second, Congress may grant jurisdiction over “Controversies,” in which federal judges focus on dispute resolution.

Arguing the Court’s justiciability doctrines must balance separation of powers objectives with competing aims of promoting liberty, ensuring rule of law, and enforcing checks and balances.

Considering the relationship and impact between Article II “unitary executive” theory and Article III “jurisdiction stripping” and concluding that theories of broad congressional power to restrict federal court jurisdiction strongly suggest limited congressional power to restructure the executive department and that theories of limited congressional jurisdiction stripping power compel a unitary executive.