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Drawing upon the original intent of the drafters of the Constitution to analyze particular issues related to judicial compensation in New York.
Explores how judicial compensation (specifically, a salary-based scheme) shaped the early judiciary, especially its unwillingness to ride circuit.
Parker Moore, Hoodwinked by Hatter: Creating a Test for Constitutional Waivers of Sovereign Immunity to Pre-Judgment Interest Awards, 27 Vt. L. Rev. 1061, 1073 (2003).
Discusses the judicial compensation clause’s roots by analyzing the writings of the founders and founding-era litigation related to the clause.
Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Official Compensation, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 501 (2002).
Analyzes the Judicial Compensation clause with reference to the Constitution’s other compensation clauses.
Analyzes the “shall not be diminished” language of the Judicial Compensation Clause and whether it protects the real economic value or the nominal value of judicial salaries. Provides an “original understanding” of the Compensation Clause, drawing on historical sources to discuss the Framers’ concern for judicial independence.
Argues that judicial salaries should be, in part, based on the cost of living in the relevant area. Looks to historical sources such as Madison, Hamilton and John Marshall in developing the argument about the role of the compensation clause.
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