Ineligibility Clause

Identifying four common uses of the term “emoluments” in the Founding era and arguing that the three uses of the term in the Constitution had common meaning, which was “compensation with financial value received by reason of public employment.”

Arguing that the scope of Teachout’s anti-corruption principle cannot extend to state officeholders.

Engaging in intratextual comparison of “interpretive default rules” in Incompatibility Clause, Emoluments Clause, and Ineligibility Clause.

Arguing that the Constitution employs different language in the Ineligibility and Incompatibility Clauses the two clauses have different focuses: bias vs. domination. 

Criticizing Teachout’s “anti-corruption principle” on the grounds that the limitation of the Ineligibility Clause, Emoluments Clause, and Foreign Gifts Clause to appointed officers likewise limits the interpretive usefulness of such a principle.

Describing the historical significance of the Ineligibility Clause and noting that it served the separation of powers, legislative accountability, and congressional “disinterestedness.”

Arguing that the Incompatibility Clause does not prevent an individual from sitting as both a senator and the President.

Arguing that the Incompatibility Clause, as originally understood, prohibited members of Congress from also serving in the military.

Arguing that the Ineligibility Clause, the Emoluments Clause, and the Foreign Gifts Clause form a core of anti-corruption provisions in the Constitution and that Buckley v. Valeo wrongly emphasized the separation of powers function of the Ineligibility Clause instead.

Conducting a textual, historical, intent-based inquiry into the proper interpretation of the Emoluments Clause and concluding that it served a broader purpose than its anti-corruption function—controlling the expansion of the federal government.

Making an intratextual comparison of Ineligibility Clause and Incompatibility Clause to argue that the Incompatibility Clause has an anti-corruption purpose.