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Discussing the meaning of “offices under the United States” in the Incompatibility Clause and the Disqualification Clause and arguing that disqualified former presidents, vice presidents, and officers of the United States are barred from holding statutory or appointed federal offices but can hold other offices.
Arguing that the Incompatibility Clause was designed to prevent corruption by assuring that different people will write and execute the laws.
Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography 171 (2012).
Contrasting the English system with the American system, the latter of which requires congressmen accepting a federal executive of judicial “Office” to immediately resign from the legislature.
Arguing that a representative or senator cannot serve as President while keeping his seat in Congress.
David J. Shaw, An Officer and A Congressman: The Unconstitutionality of Congressmen in the Armed Forces Reserve, 97 Geo. L.J. 1739 (2009).
Noting that “[d]ebate at the Constitutional Convention focused on how best to prevent corruption without deterring the most capable men from serving in Congress or disabling them, if they did serve in Congress, from serving in other positions where they were subsequently needed.”
Tillman arguing that the Incompatibility Clause does not bar a senator from retaining his seat upon assuming the presidency because the presidency is not “an Office under the United States.” Calabresi rejecting this view, describing Tillman’s parsing of the Clause as too subtle to accord with the original public meaning of “office.”
Arguing that a sitting senator can keep his seat while serving as President because the President is not part of the Executive Branch, he presides over it.
Arguing that the presidential succession statute is unconstitutional insofar as it places legislators in the line of succession.
Steven G. Calabresi, The Political Question of Presidential Succession, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 155 (1995).
Asking whether legislative officers are “Officers of the United States” and concluding that the Incompatibility Clause suggests they are not.
Suggesting that caution is warranted before concluding that the presidential succession statute is unconstitutional, as Akhil Amar argues it is.
Arguing that the greatest significance of the Incompatibility Clause is that it prevented a parliamentary government by strengthening the presidency.
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