Menu
Arguing that Congress is subject to fiduciary responsibilities when legislating under all of the Constitution’s grants of power, including the Enclave Clause, and concluding Bolling v. Sharpe was, therefore, decided correctly as a matter of original meaning.
Reviewing the history of the Enclave Clause to explain why the Clause includes both a place-and-size limitation and a consent requirement.
Contrasting the broad power of Congress over federal enclave with the narrower, incidental power provided by the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Arguing that the limitations on the size of enclaves is just as important as the state-consent requirement as an originalist matter.
Peter Raven-Hansen, The Constitutionality of D.C. Statehood, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 160 (1991).
Arguing that the Framers did not intend for D.C. to become a state.
David E. Engdahl, “State and Federal Power over Federal Property,” 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 283 (1976).
Arguing that the phrase “exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever” means that Congress may make laws regarding federal enclaves that would otherwise be impermissible under the Constitution, such as ordinary police regulations, but does not necessarily mean that Congress has exclusive jurisdiction in such areas.
C. Perry Patterson, The Relation of the Federal Government to the Territories and the States in Landholding, 28 Tex. L. Rev. 43 (1949).
Arguing that the Enclave Clause also supports that the Federal Government could not buy land from individuals in the open market or force individuals to sell land using eminent domain.
Have we missed an article? Please let us know of any additional scholarship that should be included in the Interactive Constitution.