Diversity Clause

Analyzes whether corporations are citizens within the original public meaning of Article III. Concludes that only natural persons are citizens, and thus that Section 1332(c) of the US Code is unconstitutional because corporations cannot have citizenship.

Describes the framers’ reasoning behind including diversity jurisdiction in Article III. Argues that the grant of federal jurisdiction over interstate disputes was to avoid state conflicts in interstate commerce. Posits that federal courts have impermissibly narrowed the availability of a federal forum by imposing doctrines such as complete diversity on litigants. Looks to the history and purpose of Article III’s diversity clause to argue that the requirement of complete diversity is inconsistent with it.

Argues that the conventional wisdom surrounding the meaning of the diversity clause is wrong because such jurisdiction is “limited to suits in which citizens of different states are brought within a court’s power to bind their interests.” Looks to founding-era sources such as the Marshall-Hamilton debate over the meaning of controversies between citizens of different states to understand the original meaning of the clause.

Explains four reasons for the framers’ inclusion of the diversity clause in the Federal Constitution: (1) to preserve national peace and harmony; (2) ensure that all citizens have the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states; (3) ensure fair and impartial adjudication between citizens of different states, unaffected by local politics; and (4) discharge the duty of the national government to provide adjudication with fairness and efficiency. Largely employs original intent originalism. Concludes that curtailing federal court jurisdiction should not occur lightly.