Compulsory Process Clause

Concluding, based on state constitutions that influenced the Constitution’s Compulsory Process Clause, that it was understood to safeguard the accused’s right to a meaningful opportunity to establish his case rather than placing him at the mercy of the government. Contending further that the Clause was understood to ensure the accused’s right to call for evidence, to compel witnesses, and to parity with the government.

Arguing that the Compulsory Process Clause was understood as concerning the narrow process for obtaining witnesses rather than a broader right for defendants to present evidence. Contending that this conclusion is bolstered by the absence of substantial debate over this Clause over a period of multiple years despite its failure to safeguard specific evidentiary rights for defendants.

Arguing that the Compulsory Process Clause was intended to be a broad right giving defendants the right to present a strong defense, not a limited right to call witnesses by subpoena, and was not subject to much debate.

Contending, based on records of the few debates about the Compulsory Process Clause and an early Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the Clause, that its meaning was not understood to be limited narrowly to its text.

Concluding that the Compulsory Process Clause was a development of English criminal trial procedure that was viewed as so essential by the new states that most included it in their state constitutions and insisted it be in the federal Constitution. Contending that the meaning of the Clause was not limited to its literal terms but instead granted the defendant broad power to produce witnesses and present evidence on equal footing with the prosecution. Further arguing that the Clause, when construed in light of its original purpose, did not preclude paper evidence.