Compact Clause

Arguing that the Compact Clause is semantically underspecified but should be interpreted to apply to compacts with another state “that diminish[] federal supremacy or undermines the federalist structure of this Constitution” and that determining what federal supremacy and federalist structure originally meant a matter of constitutional construction.

Reviewing colonial compacts, compacts under the Articles of Confederation, and the debates at the Constitutional Convention to argue that compacts’ approval by Congress under this clause is not subject to the Presentment Clause’s requirements.

Looking to historical sources to determine the public meaning of “duties,” “excises,” “imposts,” “tonnage,” “taxes,” and “direct taxes” at the time of the Founding.

Arguing that, while there is some ambiguity, the duty of tonnage provision is intended to prevent states from taxing, without congressional approval, vessels just for using its ports.

Looking at the Clause’s text and historical origins, as well as comparing it with other constitutional clauses, to argue that its original meaning distinguishes between interstate compacts and international compacts.

Arguing that, despite the text of the Compact Clause, which made clear that the Founders were concerned about agreements between the states, scholars and judges shifted to a more functional view of interstate compacts for efficiency.