Citizen-State Diversity

Concludes that “citizen” in Article III’s diversity clause refers to natural persons; thus, corporations cannot be considered citizens within the original public meaning of Article III. Argues that the original public meaning of “citizen” communicated a person’s ability to form affective ties with a community. Synthesizes historical accounts, primary source evidence from the framers and founding-era jurists, and corpus linguistics analysis.

Critiques Professor Ingrid Wuerth’s contention that the Constitution doesn’t grant foreign countries any procedural due process rights. Points to the history and text of the foreign citizen state diversity clause to claim that its inclusion evinced the founders’ desire that disputes with foreign nations be resolved by an independent federal judge.

Explores whether the federal courts could be stripped of some of the powers they are granted in article III. Analyzes the various drafts of the Constitution and the record of debates to conclude that the judiciary was meant to be independent, not under the control of Congress.

Argues that a textualist and originalist reading of Article III supports state sovereign immunity.

Analyzes the reason the framers included diversity jurisdiction in the constitution, despite the anti-federalists’ opposition. Argues that the anti-federalists were right that diversity jurisdiction is a powerful tool to promote national unification.

Argues that the interpretation of sovereign immunity in the modern day is flawed because it is rooted in a misunderstanding that English law prohibits recovery against the sovereign.

Argues that the framers wanted the federal courts to have alienage jurisdiction over disputes between citizens and aliens.

Cites founding-era sources to argue that the founders were concerned about suits between states and citizens as being potentially disruptive to peace and harmony.

Examines the history of the drafting and ratification of Article III to make an original intent argument. Incorporates citations to founding-era sources such as the Pinckney Plan and Hamilton plan for the Judiciary. Discusses James Wilson’s belief that the federal court must have jurisdiction over areas involving international relations because it would lead to more impartiality. Also includes drafts of constitutional language submitted to the committee of style at the end of the article.