Appellate Jurisdiction

Describes the original constitutional plan for the lower courts and Supreme Court. Argues that appellate jurisdiction was controversial at the time of the founding, but that it was viewed as vital to ensuring the supremacy and uniformity of federal law. Quotes founding-era jurist who was opposed to appellate jurisdiction and also discusses how the idea of appellate jurisdiction was an outgrowth of the national court of appeals proposed in the Articles of Confederation.

Argues that the best way to approach Article III and its exceptions is to ask whether legislative, judicial, or executive power is being exercised. Cites founding-era legal decisions affirming that Congress cannot move any case from the Court’s appellate jurisdiction to its original jurisdiction. Concludes that the Supreme Court has no appellate review over adjudicative decisions in which the body is not exercising judicial power, such as a decision from the NLRB.

Analyzes the original meaning of Article III by engaging in corpus linguistics analysis, specifically COFEA. Primarily analyzes the original understanding of the word “cases,” tracks revisions of the constitution through its drafts, and cites the writings of the framers.

Analyzes the scope of Congress’s power under the exceptions clause to shape the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Disagrees with the prevailing interpretation that Congress’s power is unlimited in this regard. Seeks to provide missing historical evidence by examining pre-1789 British case la and statutes referencing parliamentary restrictions on original or appellate jurisdiction. Concludes that the legal terms “exclusion” and “exception” were widely used and understood terms of art, and that jurisdictional exceptions in Britain were subject to definite limitations.

Analyzes the original meaning of the word “all” in Article III. Discusses that Justice Story relied on the word “all” to explain the obligatory jurisdiction of the federal courts in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee. In part responds to Professor Amar’s argument that the word “all” means that only a federal court (rather than any particular level of court) must be able to exercise jurisdiction. Contends that “all” means the same thing when used in the admiralty, federal question, ambassador, and state-as-a-party clauses in Article III. Looks to the framing and constitutional convention for his arguments.

Argues that the exceptions clause language is properly read to permit Congress to shift cases from the Court’s appellate to its original jurisdiction. Thus, Congress can’t make any exceptions to appellate jurisdiction without giving SCOTUS concurrent original jurisdiction over these cases. Looks to the original public meaning of the clause to conclude that the federal judiciary must be allowed to exercise all of the judicial power of the united states and the Supreme Court has the final jurisdictional word in all cases that raise federal issues.

Analyzes the drafting history and the evolution of the exceptions clause at the Philadelphia Convention and during the ratification debates. Cites the writings of early constitutional scholars on their view of the exceptions clause, as well as the framers. Concludes that most viewed the exceptions clause as a general power to limit appellate jurisdiction, which extends as far as Congress determines it should.

Argues that Congress has wide power to make exceptions to appellate jurisdiction. Posits that checks of unity, supremacy, and inferiority embodied in Article III limit this power. Analyzes supervision of the courts in England and early American State Courts, as well as founding-era sources such as the Judiciary Act of 1789 and early court decisions.

Examines the history of the drafting and ratification of Article III to make an original intent argument. Incorporates citations to founding-era sources such as the Pinckney Plan and Hamilton plan for the Judiciary.

Looks to the framers’ writing and the debates of the federal convention to deduce the framers’ intent surrounding the exceptions clause. Notes that there was little time spent debating the jurisdiction of the judiciary. Reviews other founding-era sources.

Analyzes whether Congress may constrict the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Concludes that the answer turns on the scope of constitutional checks on that power. Examines contemporary dictionary and common law definitions of “exceptions” to ascertain its meaning in the appellate jurisdiction clause.

Collects and analyzes scholarly commentary on the various limits Congress may place on appellate jurisdiction. Argues that the plain language of the exceptions clause permits Congress to make virtually any exception to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction as it wishes